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STATEMENT OF ISSUES1 & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err by finding a public road existed under the Dedication 
Statutes? 
"We review the trial court's legal interpretation of the Dedication Statute for correctness 
and its factual findings for clear error But whether the facts of a case satisfy the 
requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question of fact and law that involves 
various and complex facts, evidentiary resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus, 
we review the trial court's decision regarding whether a public highway has been 
established under [the Dedication Statute]... for correctness but grant the court significant 
discretion in its application of the facts to that statute." 
Jennings Investment LC, v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App. 119, ^5 (quoting Town of 
Leeds v. Prisbey, 2008 UT 1 I f 5, 179 P.3d 757). 
2. Did the trial court err by allowing Summit County to establish the width of the class 
D public road under the express statutory authority granted to counties? 
Questions of statutory construction are questions of law reviewed by the appellate courts 
under a "correction of error" standard. 
Brown & Root Industrial Service v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 
1997) citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995); Zissi v. State Tax Comrn'ru 842 
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). 
3. Did the trial court err by rejecting the Appellants takings arguments? 
Legal determinations ... are defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of 
rules or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar 
circumstances ... 
... [A]ppellate review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by 
the term "correctness." Controlling Utah case law teaches that "correctness" means the 
appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial 
judge's determination of law. [citations omitted] 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
'Appellee Summit County has not responded in this Brief to all issues and arguments 
made by the Appellant Haynes Parties as they were not specifically issues with which the County 
was involved. However, Summit County joins the Jacob-Christensen parties and the Boyer 
parties in their Briefs regarding all issues contained in those Briefs. 
vm 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 12/15/1791. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or 
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy c^ f life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 22. [Private property for public usej] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. 
UTAH STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
17-50-305. County powers to acquire, construct, and control roads and other facilities -
Retainage. 
(1) A county may: 
(a) contract for, purchase, or otherwise acquire, when necessary, rights of way for county 
roads over private property, and may institute proceedings for acquiring such rights of way as 
provided by law; 
(b) lay out, construct, maintain, control, and manage pounty roads, sidewalks, ferries and 
bridges within the county, outside of cities and towns; 
(c) designate the county roads to be maintained by the county within or extending through any 
city or town, which may not be more than three in the same direction; 
(d) abolish or abandon county roads that are unnecessary for the use of the public, in the 
manner provided by law; and 
(e) lay out, construct, maintain, control, and manage landing fields and hangars for the use of 
airplanes or other vehicles for aerial travel. 
(2) If any payment on a contract with a private contractor to construct county roads, sidewalks, 
ferries, and bridges under this section is retained or withheld, it shall be retained or withheld and 
released as provided in Section 13-8-5. 
17-50-309. Regulation of use of roads. 
A county may enact ordinances and make regulations ugt in conflict with law for the control, 
construction, alteration, repair, and use of all public roads and highways in the county outside of 
cities and towns. 
IX 
72-3-103. Count)7 roads — Class B roads — Construction and maintenance by counties. 
(1) County roads comprise all public highways, roads, and streets within the state that: 
(a) are situated outside of incorporated municipalities and not designated as state highways; 
(b) have been designated as county roads; or 
(c) are located on property under the control of a federal agency and constructed or maintained by 
the county under agreement with the appropriate federal agency. 
(2) County roads are class B roads. 
(3) The state and county have joint undivided interest in the title to all rights-of-way for all 
county roads. 
(4) The county governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of county roads within the county. 
(5) The county shall construct and maintain each county road using funds made available for that purpose. 
(6) The county legislative body may expend funds allocated to each county from the 
Transportation Fund under rules made by the department. 
(7) A county legislative body may use any portion of the class B road funds provided by this 
chapter for the construction and maintenance of class A state roads by cooperative agreement 
with the department. 
(8) A county may enter into agreements with the appropriate federal agency for the use of federal 
funds, county road funds, and donations to county road funds to construct, improve, or maintain 
county roads within or partly within national forests. 
72-3-105. Class D roads — Maps to be prepared by county — Indication of roads. 
(1) As used in this section, "class D road" means any road, way, or other land surface route that 
has been or is established by use or constructed and has been maintained to provide for usage by 
the public for vehicles with four or more wheels that is not a class A, class B, or class C road 
under this title. 
(2) Each class D road is part of the highway and road system within the state with the same force 
and effect as if the class D road had been included within this system upon its being first 
established or constructed. 
(3) The state and county have joint undivided interest in the title to all rights-of-way for class D roads. 
(4) The county governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of class D roads within the county. 
(5) Each county shall prepare maps showing to the best of its ability the class D roads within its 
boundaries which were in existence as of October 21, 1976. Preparation of these maps may be 
done by the county itself or through any multi-county planning district in which the county participates. 
(6) Any class D road which is established or constructed after October 21, 1976, shall be 
reflected on maps prepared as provided in Subsection (5). 
(7) The county shall provide a copy of any map under Subsection (5) or (6) upon completion to 
the department. 
(8) The department shall scribe each road shown on its own county map series. The department is 
not responsible for the validity of any class D road and is not responsible for its being 
inventoried. The department shall also keep on file an historical map record of the roads as 
provided by the counties. 
x 
72-5-104. Public use constituting dedication — Scope. 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously 
used as a public thoroughfare for a period often years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-of-w|ay held by the state in accordance with 
Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel 
according to the facts and circumstances. 
72-5-107. United States patents — Patentee and county to assert claims to roads crossing 
land. 
(1) (a) If any person acquires title from the United States to any land in this state over which any 
public highway extends that has not been duly platted, and that has not been continuously used as 
a public highway for a period often years, the person shall within three months after receipt of 
the person's patent assert the person's claim for damages in writing to the county executive of the 
county in which the land is situated. 
(b) The county legislative body shall have an additional period of three months in which to begin 
proceedings to condemn the land according to law. 
(2) (a) The highway shall continue open as a public highway during the periods described under 
Subsection (1). 
(b) If no action is begun by the county executive within the period described under Subsection 
(l)(b), the highway shall be considered to be abandoned by the public. 
(3) In case of a failure by the person so acquiring title to public lands to assert his claim for 
damage during the three months from the time the person received a patent to the lands, the 
person shall thereafter be barred from asserting or recovering any damages by reason of the 
public highway, and the public highway shall remain optn. 
72-5-108 Width of rights-of-way for public highways^ The width of rights-of-way for public 
highways shall be set as the highway authorities of the s^ate, counties, or municipalities may 
determine for the highways under their respective jurisdiction. 
72-5-302 Rights-of-way across federal lands - Title -t- Presumption - Scope. 
(1) This part applies to all R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. 
(2) The state and its political subdivisions have title to the R.S. 2477 rights-of-ways in 
accordance with Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-103, 72-3-104 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) (a) Acceptance of a right-of-way for the construction of a highway over public lands, not 
reserved for public uses, is presumed if the state or a pojitical subdivision of the state makes a 
finding that the highway was constructed and the right-of-way was accepted prior to October 21, 1976. 
(b) The existence of a highway in a condition suitable for public use establishes a presumption 
that the highway has continued in use in its present location since the land over which it is built 
was public land not reserved for public use. 
(4) (a) Unless specifically determined prior to the cut-off date provided in Section 72-5-301 by 
the state or a political subdivision of the state with authority over the R.S. 2477 right-of-way, the 
scope of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary for all highway 
xi 
uses as of the cut-off date determined according to the facts and circumstances, including: 
(i) highway drainage facilities; 
(ii) shoulders adjacent to the right-of-way; and 
(iii) maintenance activities defined in Section 72-5-301 that are reasonable and necessary, 
(b) Unless specifically determined by the state or political subdivision of the state with the 
authority over the R.S. 2477 right-of-way, an R.S. 2477 right-of-way is presumed to be at least 
66 feet wide if that is the usual width of highway rights-of-way in the area. 
(c) The scope of the R.S. 2477 right-of-way includes the right to widen the highway as 
necessary to accommodate the increased travel associated with those uses, up to, where 
applicable, improving a highway to two lanes so travelers can safely pass each other. 
(5) The safety standards established by the Department of Transportation in accordance with 
Section 72-6-102 apply to all determinations of safety on R.S. 2477 rights-of-way used for 
vehicular travel. 
xn 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Summit County does not dispute2 the Findings of Fact adopted by the trial court in its 
Memorandum Decision dated March 14, 2008 and incorporates them herein as a thorough and 
correct statement of the facts in this case.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The road at issue in this case was established during the territorial days of Utah, when the 
land on which the road was located and surrounding the road was in the public domain. The road 
has existed in its present location since at least 1875 and continued uninterrupted until 1932 
when the Appellants or their ancestors first took an ownership interest in the land abutting the 
road. 
Whether under the provisions of the R.S. 2477 laws4, or under the provision of Utah's 
statutory scheme showing uninterrupted public use for 10 years5, the evidence was clear, 
convincing and sufficient to support the trial court's finding that the road had been established as 
a public highway or right-of-way during the period wheii the land was in the public domain and 
prior to the Appellants taking any ownership interest in 'the land. Because the Appellants took 
2It should be noted that there is a typographical error in the Memorandum Decision at 
T|35, page 26 referencing County tax records dated 1993- The correct date is 1893. (R: 1418, trial 
exhibits 401-404) 
3R:1403-1438 
443 U.S.C. §932 (now repealed) and UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-302. For a discussion on the 
history and intent of the R.S. 2477 laws, see Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of 
Land Management, 425 F.3d 735, 740-741 (10th Cir. 2Q05) 
5UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-104 
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their interest subject to the established public right-of-way there can be no constitutional or 
compensable taking of the land either by the finding of a public road by dedication, or by 
establishing the width of the road existing prior to any property interest being held by the 
Appellant.6 
The Utah legislature has designated counties as the highway authorities over the class B 
and class D road within the counties' respective jurisdictions.7 With that grant of authority is the 
ability of counties to regulate, maintain, construct, acquire and control,8 the roads as the highway 
authority. Further, the State has granted to the counties the ability to establish the width of the 
rights-of-way or public highways within their jurisdiction,9 and has granted to counties the "sole 
jurisdiction and control of class D roads within the county."10 Finally, the State of Utah has 
determined that roads created or accepted under the R.S. 2477 laws are "presumed to be at least 
66 feet wide."11 
With the presumptive width of the road being established by the State, the broad grant of 
authority to the counties to regulate roads, and the express statutory language granting to the 
counties, the ability to establish the width of the public highway, the trial court did not err by 
6Danforth v. U.S., 308 U.S. 271, 284, 60 S.Ct. 331, 236, 84 L.Ed 240 (1939); 11A 
McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 32.132 (3d ed., Supp 2006). 
7UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-103 and §72-3-105 
8UTAH CODE ANN. §17-50-305 and §17-50-309 
9UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-108 
,0UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-105(4) 
nUTAH CODE ANN.. §72-5-302(4)(b) 
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having Summit County establish the width of the public rbad dedicated to the public by use 
before the Appellants had any ownership interest in the l^nd. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT DID NO ERR BY FINDING A PUBLIC ROAD EXISTED UNDER THE 
DEDICATION STATUTES.12 
This issue is presented by the Appellants as one challenging the Findings of Fact of the 
trial court by alleging that they do not rise to the level of dear and convincing evidence as 
required, as well as a general challenge to the sufficiency! of the evidence. 
After several hearings, four days of trial and another day of argument, the trial court 
meticulously sorted through the mountains of exhibits and evidence presented, to issue its 
carefully and thoughtfully crafted Memorandum Decisioh dated March 14, 2008. Within that 
decision are the trial court's findings of fact which include a thorough recitation of the facts and 
evidence presented and the weight given to each. Despite this careful recitation, however, the 
Appellants now seek to have the Appellate Court conduct a de novo review of the evidence and 
find as a matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient and could not support the trial court's 
finding of a road under the Dedication Statutes. 
In Utah County v. Butler 2008 UT 12 f 11, 179 P.3d 775, a case dealing with the road 
Dedication Statutes, the Utah Supreme Court declared: 
We require parties challenging factual findings of a lower court to 'first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
12The statutes referred to throughout this brief as, the "Dedication States" are UTAH CODE 
ANN. §72-5-104 and/or §72-5-302. 
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insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the 
court below' Id. (quoting Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94 ^ 21, 54 
P.3dll77). 
In their opening brief, Appellants have attempted to marshal evidence in support of the 
trial courts findings, but have failed to show how, when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court, the evidence fails to support the findings of the trial court. Rather, Appellants argue 
that the Appellate Court should conduct a de novo review of the documentary evidence that was 
admitted as exhibits, asserting that the Court of Appeals can review the documentary evidence as 
well as the trial court, to reach a result preferred by the Appellants. This invitation is not 
supported by Utah law. 
"We review the trial court's legal interpretation of the Dedication Statute for 
correctness and its factual findings for clear error. But whether the facts of a case 
satisfy the requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question of fact and 
law that involves various and complex facts, evidentiary resolutions, and 
credibility determinations. Thus, we review the trial court's decision regarding 
whether a public highway has been established under [the Dedication Statute] ... 
for correctness but grant the court significant discretion in its application of 
the facts to that statute." 
Jennings Investment LC, v. Dixie Riding Club. Inc., 2009 UT App. 119, ^5 (quoting Town of 
Leeds v. Prisbey, 2008 UT 11 H 5, 179 P.3d 757) [emphasis added]. 
Summit County has long been the situs of road litigation and many of the cases involving 
the Dedication Statutes and cited by the Appellants for other reasons, are of Summit County 
origin. A review these cases, support the findings of the trial court in this case as the evidence is 
similar if not identical to the evidence presented in this matter. 
As an example, in Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941), the road at 
issue in Summit County was one which followed East Canyon Creek through what is now the 
Jeremy Ranch area northward into Morgan County. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the finding 
Page 4 of 23 
of a public way between the years 1876 and 1894 by the trial court, based upon evidence that the 
road had existing since 1869 and had been used for "vehitular and other traffic between 1877 
and 1900". Id at 423. 
In Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107 (Utah 1958), which dealt with a road intersecting SR 133 
(Chalk Creek Road) in Eastern Summit County near Upton, Utah, and known as Middle Canyon, 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that trailing cattle and sheep, and using the road for 
"courting" was sufficient as a matter of law. "The use of the road was not great because 
comparatively few people had need to travel over it, but those of the public who had such need, 
did so" for a period exceeding 50 years. Id. at 108-109 
In Blonquist v. Blonquist 30 Utah 2d 234, 516 P|.2d 343 (1973) which dealt with another 
road intersecting SR 133 (Chalk Creek Road) near Upton, known as Southfork, the Utah 
Supreme Court determined that evidence of sheep and cattle trailing, and vehicular travel by the 
public, although not daily or weekly use, but "whenever'it was necessary or convenient" was 
sufficient to support the finding of a public road by dedication. Id. at 344. 
In Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc., v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.3d 211 (Utah 1981) another 
Summit County case involving what is known as Tollgate Road located off the interchange from 
Interstate 80 on the north side of Silver Creek Canyon bbtween Kimball Junction and Wanship, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that "the trial court's finpings on this issue will not be overturned 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them." Id. at 213. The Court then proceeded to 
uphold the trial court's finding of a public way based upon evidence of trailing sheep and 
transporting sheep camps, use by hunters, fishermen, campers picnickers, church groups and 
"more lovers... than you can imagine" Id. at 212. 
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After reviewing the case law and the facts of this case used by the trial court to support its 
decision, Appellants have not and cannot show how the evidence is insufficient as a matter of 
law to warrant a reversal of the trial courts Findings of Fact establishing the public road. 
"On appeal, 'the findings and judgment should not be disturbed unless this court 
can say affirmatively and with some degree of assurance that there is no 
reasonable basis in the evidence that could fairly and rationally support the 
requisite degree of proof, i.e. by clear and convincing evidence."5 
Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14 ^ {26, 70 P.3d 35, 43, (quoting Lamb 
v.Bangait 525 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah 1974)). 
We reverse a trial court's findings of fact only if they are 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.' In re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). In making 
such a determination, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings, and we recite the facts in accordance with that standard. 
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp., v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 
225, 228 (Utah 1996). 
In reviewing the evidence presented at trial and that relied upon by the trial court, it 
cannot be said that either the findings were erroneous, nor that they were not supported by clear 
and convincing evidence. The evidence in the instant case showed the roads existence on several 
historical maps, from 187413 until the present date, including the existence of the road on the 
County's class D road map from 197614 to the present date. To establish the public use of the 
road there was evidence of several saw mills, sheep dipping corrals that accommodated hundreds 
of thousands of sheep in the area, several homesteads and residential cabins, hunting, fishing, 
camping, picnicking and some dancing and dating as often as the public wanted or had need to 
13Tnal exhibits 163-174 
14Trial exhibit 205 
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go. There was also evidence of the use of water from the Istream along the road and at various 
points, County maintenance of portions of the road and county records showing an interest in 
keeping the roads open.15 
The trial courts careful articulation of the evidence on which the findings were based was 
more than sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence standard and Appellants have 
failed to show how this evidence taken in the light most favorable to the trial courts' findings, 
rises to the level of clear error. 
Notwithstanding the abundance of evidence, as additional support for the claim of error, 
Appellants assert that prior to their acquiring any ownership interest in the land, the use of the 
road and the land was permissive and thus no dedication could occur. However, there is no 
evidence in the record that between the period of 1875 and 1896 the use of the land or the road 
was permissive such that it granted to each person or member of the pubic using the road, a 
private right of use. To the contrary, the trial court found that the Boyer parties who have owned 
their property interest longer than any other party, had ny permissive, prescriptive or other rights 
across the road other than the public right-of-way.16 
Appellants also seem to argue that there needs to be an "intent" of the underlying property 
owner to have the road dedicated to public use before a public right-of-way can be found under 




17Appellants Opening Brief at p. 30, footnote 116 
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The determination that a roadway has been continuously used by members of the general 
public for at least 10 years is the sole requirement for it to become a public road. It is not 
necessary to prove the owner's intent to offer the road to the public as contended by 
defendants. [The Dedication Statutes] deems a dedication to the public as a matter of law 
when the required public use is established.' 
Leo M. Bertagnole. Inc., v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.3d 211,213 (Utah 1981) {quoting 
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). 
Additionally, as stated above, the road wras established long before the Haynes parties 
took an interest in the land abutting the road. At the time, the road was located on property in the 
public domain, being owned by the United States Government and later the State of Utah. That 
government through the 1866 adoption of 43 U.S.C.A. §932 or the R.S.2477 laws, gave clear 
intention of having the public create and use rights of way on federal land not reserved for public 
use.18 
A road or right-of-way established on public land, not reserved for public use establishes 
a presumption of a public "highway" or road. UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-302(3)(b). Additionally, a 
"highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare for a period often years." UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104. 
The evidence of the existence of the East Fork roads (including the Bench portion, the 
Middle Fork portion and the East Loop portion) from as early as 1875 is undisputed. Their use 
by the public for myriad purposes from 1865 through 1932 is also undisputed. It is only the 
effect this evidence has or the weight to be given the evidence that is disputed by the Appellants. 
Thus, the creation of these roads while on public land and their use for more than 50 years before 
the Haynes parties acquired an interest in the land, more than satisfies the legislative 
18Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 425 F.3d, 735, 
740-41 (10th Gr. 2005). 
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requirements for dedication to the public.19 
By 1932, when the Appellants first took an interest in the land surrounding the road in 
question, they took their ownership interest subject to the public highway. In another very similar 
Summit County case, the Utah Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Condas. 76 Utah 585, 290 P.954, 
957 (Utah 1930) declared, 
". . . and the Appellants when they acquired their interest in and to 
the lands, took them subject to the easement in favor of the public, 
unless it was thereafter extinguished by operation of the state law, 
which was not done." 
In the Sullivan case, there was a dispute over a road being used for grazing sheep and cattle. The 
trial court found, and the Supreme Court upheld that there was "ample and satisfactory" evidence 
to show that 
"as early as 1873 the roadway extended up and down the canyon 
over the lands now owned by the Appellant and the defendant and 
others, while such lands were a part of the public domain, and was 
traveled and used by the public generally as occasion require in 
going up and down the canyon." Id. 
The court went on further to say that by the time the Appellants in that case acquired their 
interest in the land in 1922 or 1924, they took subject to that public easement. Id. The Court 
then went on to state: 
Under the laws of the territory of Utah (Laws 1880, chap. 29; Laws 
1886, chap. 12, Comp. Laws 1888, § 2066, Rev. St 1898 § 1115, 
and carried into Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 2802), a highway is 
deemed and taken as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously and interruptedly used as a 
public thoroughfare for a period often years, and when once 
established must continue to be a highway until abandoned by 
]9Memmot v. Anderson. 642 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah 1982). 
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order of the board of county commissioners of the county in which 
it is located or by a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. 
14 
Thus, the law in 1932 when the Appellant's first took their interest in the land on which the road 
is sited, created a roadway by use which was superior in interest to the rights acquired by the 
Appellant Haynes parties. The law also required that a formal action be taken to abandon the 
public interest in the road and it is undisputed that to date, the County has not vacated the road. 
The Appellants in the trial of this matter took great care to present evidence which 
showed that from 1932 until the present date, the Haynes parties attempted to interrupt the 
public's use of the road by placing gates or locks across the roadways and by requiring a 
condemnation of the road in 1939 for the Chalk Creek Hoystville Water Users. Even if all the 
Appellant's evidence was taken as true, as a matter of law, it is irrelevant. Under Utah law, the 
road had been established and dedicated to the public by use long before they acquired their 
interest and the only way to vacate a public road is to follow the statutory scheme now found in 
UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-108 (1953 as amended), which is the same requirement that existed in 
1932. 
The trial courts finding of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence of the 
existence and use of the roads found to be dedicated to the public and there was no error in the 
trial courts findings which would warrant a reversal of this matter. 
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2. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY ALLOWING SUMMIT COUNTY TO DETERMIN THE 
WIDTH OF THE ROAD UNDER THE EXPRESS STATUTORY AUTHORITY GRANTED TO 
COUNTIES. 
"Questions of statutory construction are questions of law reviewed by the appellate courts 
under a 'correction of error' standard/' Brown & Root Industrial Service v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997) citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 
1199 (Utah 1995); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). 
In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. We do so by first 
evaluating 'the best evidence' of legislative intent, namely, 'the plain language of the 
statute itself.' We give words of a statute their 'plain and ordinary meaning, in the 
absence of any statutory or well established technical meaning, unless it is plain from the 
statute that a different meaning is intended.' 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, ^  13, 179 P.3d 768 fauotins State v. Martinez, 2002 
UT 80, H 8, 52 P.3d 1276 and State v. Navaro, 83 Utah 6, 26 P.2d 955, 956 (1933)). 
A. Authority of Summit County to establish the width 
The Utah legislature has designated counties as the highway authorities over the class B 
and class D road within the counties' respective jurisdictions.20 Class B road are those on which 
there is on-going maintenance by the county and for which the counties receive state funding. 
Class D roads, are all other roads within unincorporated areas of the county which are not 
designated as state roads. The road at issue in this case is a class D road. 
With the statutory designation as the highway authority, is within the authority granted to 
Summit County to regulate, maintain, construct, acquire and control,21 the class D roads 
20UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-103 and §72-3-105 
21UTAH CODE ANN. §17-50-305 and §17-50-309 
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including the road at issue. This authority is further expanded by the express grant of authority to 
the counties to establish the width of the rights-of-way or public highways within their 
jurisdiction,22 and by the grant to counties, the "sole jurisdiction and control of class D roads 
within the county."23 
While the Haynes parties do not dispute that once found to be a public highway, the 
appropriate highway authority for the road would be Summit County, they do allege that it was 
reversible error for the trial court to follow the express statutory language of UTAH CODE ANN. §72-
5-108 which grants to counties the authority to set the width of public highways as well as the 
dictates of UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-105(4) which grants to counties the "sole jurisdiction and 
control of class D roads within the county." 
In support of their position, the Appellant Haynes parties cite several Utah cases in which 
the width of roads dedicated to the public have been discussed and decided by the courts. They 
argue that because the couts determine the width in the cited case, it is a core judicial function 
which only the courts can perform. However, none of the cases cited by the Appellants24 address 
the application of UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-108 in cases involving the Dedication Statute nor do any 
of the cases stand for the proposition that only the courts can decide the width of the road in 
those case, or that it was reversible error for the Court to rely on the County to establish what is 
"reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel" under the Dedication Statutes.25 the effect of the 
22UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-108 
23UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-105(4) 
24See Appellants Opening Brief, at p. 17, footnote 80. 
25
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-5-104. 
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express and plain statutory language of UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-108 in cases involving the 
Dedication Statutes appears to be one of first impression before the Utah Appellate Courts. The 
cases cited by the Appellant address various width issues in different manners, but none address 
the statutory provisions. The Appellant's argument that a width determination is solely within 
the court's powers, or that court cannot or should not delegate to the county or other highway the 
responsibility of determining a width, misstates the issue, is not supported by any cited law and is 
contrary to the plain language of the statutes. This same argument was made before the trial 
court and was properly rejected by the trial court.26 
There is no dispute in the record that prior to the Haynes parties acquiring their first 
interest in the land, the roads in question existed and were used by the public for myriad purposes 
including recreating at the lakes and in meadows along the road, trailing sheep or livestock, 
hunting, gathering and milling lumber and establishing homesteads to name a few. While the 
Appellants do dispute the sufficiency of this evidence, the evidence itself is undisputed. It is also 
recognized and undisputed by the Appellants that during the period between 1869 and 1896 
when this road was in use and dedicated to the public by use, the odd numbered sections of land 
over which the road crossed were public lands.27 
The dedication of the road by use while on public lands not reserved for public use during 
this time period classifies this road as an R.S. 2477 road under the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 
72-5-302 and 43 U.S.C. §932 (now repealed). As an R.S. 2477 road, the width of the road has 
;R: 1467-1474,1687 
'R: 1413 
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been presumptively predetermined by the State of Utah as being 66 feet in width.28 Under the 
Dedication Statute "[t]he scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary to 
ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances,"29 and the state Legislature has 
determined that for R.S. 2477 roads, the reasonable and necessary width is 66 feet. 
In light of the presumptive width of 66 feet set by the State, if the width is established by 
the County at something less than 66 feet it cannot be deemed unreasonable. Further, with the 
broad grant of authority given to the counties, and the express and plain statutory language 
granting to the counties, the ability to establish the width of the public highways, the trial court 
did not err by having Summit County establish the width of the public road dedicated to the 
public by use before the Appellants had any ownership interest in the land. 
B. Reasonable and necessary width is greater than 8-10 feet 
Appellants insist that the roads in question are limited to 8-10 feet in width,30 as the 
traveled path of the road, and further insist that despite the specific statutory provisions regarding 
the scope of the right-of-way being that which is "reasonable an necessary"31 to ensure safe 
travel, the only consideration which can be had is the historical use of the road rather than that 
which is necessary to ensure safe travel. This argument was also rejected by the trial court.32 
28
 UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-105(4)(b) 
29
 UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-104(3) 
30Appellants Opening Brief at pp. 11, 19 
31UTAH CODE ANN. §72-3-104(3). 
32R:1473. 
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In making the alternative claims that 1) the width is limited to 8-10 feet; or 2) the width 
should be limited to 18 feet; or 3) the width should be limited to some historical use, Appellants 
ignore the trial courts findings regarding the myriad uses of the road which exceeded the 8-10 
foot width as well the trial courts own admonishment that his "feelings" regarding the 18 foot 
width was dicta.33 Appellants also ignore other evidence, including the affidavit of Gerald 
Boyer34 and Steve Jacob35 which measures the existing traveled road width as between 16 feet 
and 45 feet and ignores the statutory provisions of the dedication statutes which set forth that the 
"scope of the right-of-way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel 
according to the facts and circumstances."36 It ignores too, the affidavit of Derrick Radke, 
Summit County Engineer which articulates that the minimum width necessary to ensure the safe 
travel of two vehicles in opposite directions with sufficient emergency pull out and maintenance, 
is 36 feet.37 
Appellants do not put forth that their 8-10 foot width is one which is either reasonable or 
safe for travel, but rather argue that the issue of width should be remanded back to the trial court, 
with this Court directing the trial court to determine width only in light of the use at the time of 




36UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-104(3). 
37R: 1493-1496 
38Appellant Opening Brief at p. 29. 
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statutory language of UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-104(3) regarding the scope of the right-of-way, and 
the long line of cases supporting the statutory language which sets the scope of the right-of-way 
as that which is reasonably necessary to achieve safe travel under the circumstances. 
The case law interpreting that statutory provision supports a determination that the width 
of the road is not 8-10 feet as suggested by Appellants or even 18 feet as alternatively argued, but 
that which is reasonable and necessary for safe travel. "The width [is] not limited to the beaten 
path, but that which was reasonably safe and convenient for the use to which the road was put." 
Blonquist v. Blonquist supra at 344. This theme has been consistent in Utah law. 
In the landmark case of Jeremy v. Bertagnole, supra at 423 {quoting Whitesides v. Green, 
13 Utah 341,44 P. 1032, 1033 (1896)) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
'Counsel for the appellant appear to insist that the public have only a right to travel on the 
beaten path, and must be confined to one rod [16.5 feet] in width. We cannot agree with 
counsel that, when the public have acquired the right to a public highway by user, they are 
limited to such width as has actually been used by them. Generally, the greater part of the 
travel on a county highway is doubtless confined to the track made by vehicles, but the 
must be room enough for travelers with wagons, carriages, or implements to pass each 
other, and for necessary improvements and repairs to be made so as to keep it in a 
suitable condition. ... [W]here the public have acquired the easement the land subject to it 
has passed under the jurisdiction of the public authorities, for the purpose of keeping the 
same in proper condition for the enjoyment thereof by the public. Such authorities are 
bound to keep the road open and in suitable repair, and, if obstructions be placed thereon, 
it is their duty to remove the same, and care for the rights of the public' 
In the case of Hunsaker v. State, 29 Utah 2d 322, 326, 509 P.2d 352, 354 (1973), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
This court has reiterated that where the public has acquired the right to a public highway 
by user, they are not limited to such width as has been actually used. The use carries with 
it such use as is reasonably necessary for the public easement of travel. Jeremy v. 
Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941), Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341, 44 
P.1032 (1896). In Meservev v. Guilliford 14 Idaho 113, 93 P. 780 (1908), the court 
observed that a statute which establishes the width of a highway should be considered as 
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a declaration of the width that is reasonably necessary for the convenience of the public 
generally. 
In Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corp., v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 
supra at 228 the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"[WJhere the evidence establishes dedication of a roadway...the width of such roadway is 
not to be ... measured by the boundaries of the beaten track.5' Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 
Utah 1, 8, 116 P.2d 420, 423 (1941). Instead, it is " ' proper and necessary for the court 
in defining the road to determine its width, and to fix the same according to what was 
reasonable and necessary, under all the facts and circumstances, for the uses which were 
made of the road.' " Id. (quoting Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 
384, 392, 285 P. 646, 649 (1929)); see also Memmott v. Anderson. 642 P.2d 750, 754 
(Utah 1982). 
Notwithstanding the litany of cases which affirm that the width and scope is that which is 
reasonable and necessary for safe travel and that the scope is not limited to the beaten path as 
suggested by Appellants, if this Court were to look only at the fact that the road in question was 
an R.S. 2477 road, then under the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-302 there is a presumption 
that the scope or width of the right-of-way is 66 feet, and that the declaration of the width 
establishes the scope of the right-of-way as that which is reasonable and necessary for safe travel. 
Hunsaker, supra at 354. 
In discussing the R.S. 2477 status of a Summit County road in Boyer v. Clark supra at 
109, the Utah Supreme Court declared: 
"In Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646, 648, this Court 
pointed out that congress in 1866 enacted Section 2477, Revised Statutes of the United 
States (43 U.S.C.A. § 932) wherein it granted the right of way for public highways over 
public lands not reserved for public uses, and that an acceptance of such grant could be 
made 'by public use without formal action by public authorities, and that continued use of 
the road by the public for such length of time and under such circumstances as to clearly 
indicate an intention on the part of the public to accept the grant is sufficient.' We further 
pointed out that under our territorial laws a continuous and uninterrupted use of a road by 
the public for a period of 10 years was sufficient to create a public highway by use, and 
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where the evidence showed that 'while the lands traversed by the road were public lands 
of the United States the road was used as a public thoroughfare' for a period exceed that 
required by our statutes for creating a public highway by use, such evidence cis sufficient 
in law to amount to an acceptance of the congressional grant of the right of way over the 
public lands, and thus would constitute and create the road in question a public highway 
by dedication.' See also Jeremy v. Bertagnole. 101 Utah 1,116 P.2d 420, 423. 
Under the provisions of the Utah Code as well as these decisions, the road in question is 
undoubtedly an R.S. 2477 road and Appellant's arguments are in direct contravention of the 
statutory presumption of 66 feet. 
The end result is that there was no error on the part of the trial court in giving the 
appropriate highway authority the responsibility of fixing the width of the road. The plain 
language of the statute grants to counties the ability to determine the width of class D roads. 
There is also a presumption in the statutes that the width of the road is 66 feet and a 
determination of anything less which still meets the statutory scope requirement of a width which 
"reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the facts and circumstances" does 
not rise to the level of reversible or clear error. 
3. THE APPELLANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO ASSERT A TAKINGS CLAIM UNDER THE UTAH 
OR U.S. CONSTITUTIONS. 
Throughout Haynes' Brief are arguments, references, suggestions, and innuendo that by 
finding that the road in question was dedicated to the public by use, Summit County (or the 
court) has effected a "taking" under Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution and the 5th 
amendment of the United States Constitution. Haynes further alleges that if either the court or 
Summit County determines that the width of the road is greater than the 8-10 feet asserted by 
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Haynes, that too would be a taking under the Utah and U.S. constitutions. 
These same arguments were made before the trial court and were twice rejected. In its 
Memorandum Decision of March 21,2008 the trial court stated: 
"Haynes' contention that this "road widening" could amount to a taking is 
rejected. Again, this public road was actually created long before Haynes 
purchased the property and Haynes took the property subject to the public's right 
of usage. The court is now merely determining, if it must, what that usage is as 
far as being reasonably necessary and convenient to the public today. A width 
such that two vehicles can pass each other is deemed by the court to be reasonable 
and proper." 39 
After hearing argument on a motion to reconsider the trial court again confirmed its decision in 
the Ruling and Order dated August 28, 2008, wherein it stated: 
"Haynes arguments as to the 'takings' are again rejected. The court determined 
previously and reaffirms that Haynes never had something to take. This road was 
public before Haynes bought the property and Haynes accepted and took the 
property subject to that public right."40 
The trial court's rulings were correct as a matter of law. Takings claims are personal in 
nature and property owners that acquire land after the road (including the scope or width of the 
road) has been established under the Dedication Statutes, take that land subject to the public's 
interest in the road and cannot thereafter make a claim of a constitutional taking. Danforth v. 
U.S., 308 U.S. 271, 284, 60 S.Ct. 331, 236, 84 L.Ed 240 (1939) (takings claims are personal to 
the property owner and do not run with the land); Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P.954, 
957 (Utah 1930); 11A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 32.132 (3d ed., Supp 2006). Because the 
Haynes Appellants took their land subject to the established road, they do not have any standing 
39R: 1474 
40R: 1687 
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to make a takings challenge and the arguments and suggestions to the contrary in their brief are 
without merit. 
Even assuming that the Haynes parties had a compensable takings claim, a road created 
while the land was in the public domain prior to U.S. patents has a statutory requirement for 
those seeking a takings claims which can be found in UTAH CODE ANN. §72-5-107. There is no 
evidence that this was followed by the Haynes parties. Failure to follow the required procedure, 
assuming that there is standing to make a claim, creates a fatal flaw in any allegation of a taking. 
Without following the proper procedures, a takings claim is not ripe for decision and cannot be 
made. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 194, 105 S.Ct 1308, 87 Led.2d 126 (1985), Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 
7 135, 67 P3d 466, 476-77. Both the federal and Utah laws require that the administrative 
processes of the County be exhausted before a takings claim can be had under either constitution. 
Id, Gardner v. Board of Commissioners of Wasatch County, 2008 UT 6,1126-29, 178 P.3d 
893,901-902. It is undisputed that no administrative process has been requested or taken place. 
CONCLUSION 
A road established by the public during the territorial days of Utah, when the land on 
which the road was located was in the public domain is a public highway and the trial court did 
not err in finding it had been dedicated to the public by use. The road has existed in its present 
location since at least 1875 and continued uninterrupted, being used by the public as often as 
necessary, until 1932 when the Appellants first took an ownership interest in the land abutting 
the road. 
Whether under the provisions of the R.S. 2477 laws, or under the provision of Utah's 
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statutory scheme showing uninterrupted public use for 10 years, the evidence was sufficient and 
supports the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that the road had long been 
established as a public right-of-way or public road during the period when the land was in the 
public domain and prior to the Appellant's taking any ownership interest in the land. 
The Utah legislature has designated counties as the highway authorities over the class B 
and class D road within the counties' respective jurisdictions. With that grant of authority is the 
ability of counties to regulate, maintain, construct, acquire and control, the roads as the highway 
authority. Further, the State has granted to the counties the ability to establish the width of the 
rights-of-way or public highways within their jurisdiction, and has granted to counties the "sole 
jurisdiction and control of class D roads within the county." Therefore, the trial court did not err 
when deferring to the express and plain statutory language granting counties the authority to 
establish the width of the class D road. 
Inasmuch as the State of Utah has determined that roads created or accepted under the 
R.S. 2477 laws are "presumed to be at least 66 feet wide," a determination that the scope of the 
right-of-way established by use is anything less than 66 feet is reasonable and does not rise to the 
level of clear error warranting a reversal. 
Appellant first took their interest in the land subject to the public's existing right-of-way 
and as a result, Appellants have no standing to assert any sort of takings claim under the Utah or 
U.S. constitutions. As a result, the trial court did not err in twice rejecting the Appellants takings 
arguments and claims for lack of standing. There can also be no constitutional or compensable 
taking of the land by establishing the width of a road existing prior to any property interest being 
held by the Appellant. 
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Notwithstanding the efforts Appellants to interrupt the public use of the road, the efforts 
were insufficient as a matter of law, to abandon the public's interest once established. As such, 
the road in question is and continues to be a public highway classified as a class D county road 
and the order of the trial court should be affirmed in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED and DATED this loiCjf^uU , 2009. 
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